



Peer-to-Peer Power Trading with Voltage and Congestion Management for Distribution Grids

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Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Energy Markets

- Function alongside the existing retail energy Energy and Ancillary Service market arrangements in a distribution grid. Management
- Allow prosumers to establish bilateral energy trading contracts between them.
 - include the amount of power exchange and the price per unit of energy.
- Power transactions between prosumers result in additional ancillary service requirements
 - Voltage and congestion management.
- Follow a decentralized market mechanism as prosumers are not willing to share their internal information.
 - A two-stage decentralized P2P energy
 market framework.





- **DSO-to-prosumer** and **prosumer-to-prosumer** coordination and optimization.
 - Alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM)



Case Study and Results

- IEEE 33-bus system is used to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed ADMM-based coordination-optimization algorithm for a single market interval.
 - Six producers and seven consumers.
 - Five additional sources of provisioning ancillary service are also considered in addition to the point-of-common-coupling.
- Figure (above) shows the convergence trajectories of the infinity norms of the residuals of each consumer, producer, and the DSO.
- Figure (below) shows that the **power consumption/production of the prosumers** are significantly different for
 - Scenario 1: without considering the grid constraints (and ancillary service costs), and
 - Scenario 2: considering ancillary service costs-

proposed approach.





Case Study and Results

- Ancillary services costs associated with producer-consumer pairs are reported in Table.
 - difference between DLMPs of buyer buses and _ seller buses.
- Figure shows the trading price decomposition between consumer 6 and the set of producers.
- Marginal generation cost of producer 2 is lower than that of producer 4.
- The **negative ancillary services costs** between consumer 6 and producer 4, enforces consumer 6 to purchase power from producer 4 and abandon producer 2.



| (h) | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 | C7 |
|---------------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| P1 | 1.254 | 1.380 | 1.585 | 0.770 | 0.149 | 1.265 | 1.346 |
| $\mathbf{P2}$ | 1.101 | 1.227 | 1.432 | 0.617 | -0.005 | 1.111 | 1.192 |
| $\mathbf{P3}$ | -0.009 | 0.117 | 0.321 | -0.493 | -1.115 | 0.001 | 0.082 |
| $\mathbf{P4}$ | -0.082 | 0.044 | 0.249 | -0.566 | -1.187 | -0.071 | 0.010 |
| $\mathbf{P5}$ | 1.099 | 1.225 | 1.430 | 0.615 | -0.006 | 1.109 | 1.191 |
| $\mathbf{P6}$ | -0.112 | 0.013 | 0.218 | -0.597 | -1.218 | -0.102 | -0.021 |
| | | | | | | | |



• Consumers only prefer to trade when the **marginal aggregated costs** of the offers are less than their marginal welfare.



Conclusions/Recommendations

- Novel **ADMM-based coordinating algorithm** is proposed to enable distributed P2P energy trading in distribution grid level.
- Each prosumer in the P2P energy market and the DSO solve individual optimization problems while respecting the privacy concerns of each other.
- The case studies were conducted on the IEEE 33-bus system.
- The proposed market clearing algorithm converges to the optimal solution with sufficient accuracy in an acceptable computation time.
- P2P energy trading without considering the grid constraints resulted in infeasible power transactions.
- Prosumers evaluate the cost of ancillary services required to facilitate each P2P power transaction within the distributed market mechanism, which determines the equilibrium.



